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Metaphysics for the Marriage Debate 
JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS* 
This paper is not about what marriage should be, or even whether it 
should exist at all.  Its purpose is mainly methodological: an attempt, in 
the spirit of Locke,1 to clear away some of the rubbish that lies in the 
way of proper identification of the problems.  In particular, it argues that 
much confusion arises from unarticulated assumptions about the idea of 
natural law. 
Unclarity about this issue also muddied the nineteenth century debate 
about marriage,  and even though the issues now are very different from 
the ones being disputed then, the controversies of the time help to put in 
a clearer light some of the problems that still confuse the debate about 
what marriage is and ought to be. 
I.  MARRIAGE AS AN INSTITUTION 
Marriage is a social institution, not just a matter of individuals’ living 
or raising children together, or even of their making private contracts 
about kinds and levels of commitment. Its essence lies not in how 
married people treat each other, but in how other people treat them—in 
particular, though not only, through laws and formal institutions. 
This means that to understand the meaning of marriage in any society 
it is not enough to survey the phenomenon of married life, because this 
cannot differentiate between the effect of the institutions and what would 
have happened if they had been otherwise or nonexistent.  What needs to 
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be understood are the laws, institutions and conventions that press 
people in the direction of choices that they otherwise might not have 
made: rules and conventions determining such matters as who can enter 
into it, pressures on single people to become married, the nature of the 
contract between the partners, the possibilities for ending it, and so on.  
It is through an analysis of these institutions that the real meaning of 
marriage in any society can be understood; and, for the same reasons, it 
is such institutions that defenders of any particular form of marriage 
need to justify. 
The importance of looking at institutional structures, rather than at the 
state of individual marriages, was recognized by John Stuart Mill in his 
writing on the subjection of women.2  He was campaigning for legal 
equality between the sexes, and had to keep insisting that in considering 
whether current laws could be justified, it was irrelevant to consider the 
situation of women as they actually lived, let alone to point out the 
happiest of them as exemplars of the ideal of marriage.  If the legal 
position of women amounted to slavery, as he claimed it did, it was 
irrelevant to reply that most women were not treated as slaves: 
    I have no desire to exaggerate, nor does the case stand in any need of 
exaggeration.  I have described the wife’s legal position, not her actual 
treatment. . . .  Happily there are both feelings and interests which in many men 
exclude, and in most, greatly temper, the impulses and propensities which lead 
to tyranny . . . 
    . . .   
    . . .  Who doubts that there may be great goodness, and great happiness, and 
great affection, under the absolute government of a good man?  Meanwhile, 
laws and institutions require to be adapted, not to good men, but to bad.3 
The whole purpose of laws and institutions is to change what would 
otherwise happen, so their justification must be in those terms.  They 
cannot be justified by reference to what might happen independently, or 
in spite of them. 
II.  THE TRADITIONAL MEANING OF MARRIAGE 
Mill was concerned with two aspects of women’s situation.  One was 
the laws and institutions, as well as less formal conventions, that closed 
most options in life to women just by virtue of their being women, and 
in so doing forced most of them into dependence on men.  The other was 
 2. JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (Susan Moller Okin ed., 
Hackett Publ’g Co. 1988) (1869). 
 3. Id. at 35, 36. 
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the asymmetrical marriage laws that gave men virtually unlimited 
control over their wives. In the worst cases this left wives at the mercy 
of appalling tyrants (“[t]he vilest malefactor has some wretched woman 
tied to him”)4 but in all cases dependent for their fate on the character 
of their masters.  Mill’s contention was that all this was quite incompatible 
with modern political beliefs, according to which slavery was 
straightforwardly wrong, and no one should be precluded by the accident 
of birth from the opportunity to realize their full potential. 
How, then, could this state of affairs be justified by its apologists?  By 
far the commonest defense was that men and women were different by 
nature, and as such naturally suited to quite different roles.  As one of 
Mill’s most articulate opponents, James Fitzjames Stephen, said: 
The physical differences between the two sexes affect every part of the human 
body, from the hair of the head to the sole of the feet, from the size and density 
of the bones to the texture of the brain and the character of the nervous 
system . . . . [A]ll the talk in the world will never shake the proposition that men 
are stronger than women in every shape.  They have greater muscular and 
nervous force, greater intellectual force, greater vigour of character.  This 
general truth, which has been observed under all sorts of circumstances and in 
every age and country, has also in every age and country led to a division of 
labour between men and women, the general outline of which is as familiar and 
as universal as the general outline of the differences between them.5 
Because the sexes were so different, he argued, it would be cruel and 
inappropriate to give them the same rights and duties.  As men were 
stronger (“in every shape”) than women, it was obvious that they should 
be the heads of households and protectors of their families.  Women 
were naturally suited to their traditional position, and, Stephen claimed, 
had no objection to it.  It was therefore in women’s interests that they 
should remain in their subordinate place. 
Against arguments of this kind, Mill produced three lines of attack:    
First, he argued, the general claim about women’s nature was, at the 
very least, not universally true.  Everyone knew that many women were 
not satisfied with their position. 
Ever since there have been women able to make their sentiments known by their 
writings (the only mode of publicity which society permits to them), an 
 4. Id. at 37. 
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increasing number of them have recorded protests against their present social 
condition . . . .6 
Second, even the women who did not protest could not be presumed 
to be naturally suited to their position.  For one thing, women were 
brought up in a systematically different way from men, and it was 
therefore impossible to know how many of the observed differences 
between the sexes could be attributed to a difference in their 
fundamental natures.7  And, furthermore, even if individual women did 
manage to think beyond their straitened upbringing, their being under 
the power of their husbands would make protest straightforwardly 
dangerous. 
And finally, the most significant point of all, if women’s traditional 
position really were natural to them, there would simply be no point in 
all the laws designed to keep them in their place, because such laws 
would have nothing to do.  As Mill said, it was supposed to be natural 
for women to be wives and mothers, but to judge from the devices in 
place to prevent them from doing anything else, you might reasonably 
suppose that it was the last thing their nature led them to do.8 
Mill’s arguments seem beyond challenge to most present-day readers, 
and it is interesting to consider why they made so little impact at the 
time.  It was partly, as Mill realized, because people had strong feelings 
about these matters, and feelings were hard to dislodge by reason.  But 
there seems to be more to it than that.  The root of the problem seems to 
lie in a quite different understanding of what is meant by “natural.” 
By what is natural to people, Mill means something like what they 
will do if given wide opportunities and left to their own devices. 
    One thing we may be certain of—that what is contrary to women’s nature to 
do, they never will be made to do by simply giving their nature free play. The 
anxiety of mankind to interfere in behalf of nature, for fear lest nature should 
not succeed in effecting its purpose, is an altogether unnecessary solicitude.9 
To Mill it seems that the whole point of laws is to make people do 
what is, in this sense, not natural to them.  But Stephen sees the point of 
laws as “to clothe, protect and sustain society in the position which it 
naturally assumes”.10 
Government . . . ought to fit society as a man’s clothes fit him.  To establish by 
law rights and duties which assume that people are equal when they are not is 
like trying to make clumsy feet look handsome by the help of tight boots.  No 
doubt it may be necessary to legislate in such a manner as to correct the vices of 
 6. MILL, supra note 2, at 14. 
 7. E.g., id. at 14, 22. 
 8. Id. at 28. 
 9. Id. at 27–28. 
 10. STEPHEN, supra note 5, at 192 (emphasis added). 
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society or to protect it against special dangers or diseases to which it is liable.  
Law in this case is analogous to surgery, and the rights and duties imposed by it 
might be compared to the irons which are sometimes contrived for the purpose 
of supporting a weak limb or keeping it in some particular position.  As a rule, 
however, it is otherwise.  Rights and duties should be so moulded as to clothe, 
protect and sustain society in the position which it naturally assumes.11 
To Stephen, it seems that the proper purpose of laws is to correct what 
is aberrant and against nature.  The natural is therefore not simply what 
happens, but what ought to happen. 
Another comment suggests what lies behind this idea: 
    To sum the matter up, it appears to me that all the laws and moral rules by 
which the relation between the sexes is regulated should proceed upon the 
principle that their object is to provide for the common good of the two great 
divisions of mankind . . . who can no more have really conflicting interests than 
the different members of the same body . . . .12 
Stephen seems to be arguing against the background of an idea of the 
world as a naturally ordered whole, whose smooth functioning depends 
on everything’s staying in the place it is designed to fit. 
This is a much older and more firmly established idea of nature than 
Mill’s.  One of its roots is the Greek, and in particular Aristotelian, idea 
of a natural order in which there is a cosmic harmony as long as 
everything keeps in its proper place and acts according to its true nature.  
In this view of the world, to understand the nature of anything is to 
understand the unchangeable essence of things of that kind, and to 
understand their essence is to understand their true place in the scheme 
of things.  Disorder and discord occurs when things are not in the positions 
they should be occupying.  The other root is the Judaic idea of a God 
who brought order out of chaos, and in doing so designed the various 
elements of the universe in a way that would result in harmony as long 
as divine law was obeyed.  These two traditions were fused, more or 
less, in Christianity, with its ideas of natural law. 
In this composite tradition, therefore, to understand the nature of 
something is to understand its proper place in the scheme of things, 
where all goes well until beings with free will rebel against it.  This is 
obviously the idea Stephen has in mind: Women and men are 
designed—by God or nature—to live together and rear families.  They 
cannot have radically different interests, because only by keeping to 
 11. Id. at 192. 
 12. Id. at 197–98. 




their proper places can they bring about the smooth functioning of 
family and society that is best for both.  Of course, aberrant individuals 
will try to distort the natural scheme of things, but that shows “a base, 
unworthy, mutinous disposition,”13 and the proper function of laws and 
institutions is to prevent that from happening.  Laws are needed to bring 
about what is in this sense natural, because the natural is not just what 
happens.  The natural is the way things ought to be. 
Doubts about the idea of a universe in which the natural was good had 
of course been around for a long time.  Many people had claimed that 
the natural world was not in the least harmonious, and that the purpose 
of laws must be to impose some order on the nasty and brutish state of 
nature.  In this tradition there had always been problems about how to 
account for the kinds of order that the world obviously did contain, and 
the plausible idea that order implied an intelligent orderer went well with 
the idea that there was a moral order integrated with the physical.  But 
we can now see, looking back, that at the time of Mill and Stephen, 
Charles Darwin had just made the breakthrough that showed in principle 
there could be order of the kind observed in nature without there being 
any design or underlying moral order. 
To understand the nature of something in this scheme of things is 
simply to understand what it is like and how it works: what it can 
influence and what it can be influenced by, and how.  It implies nothing 
at all about where it ought to be, or what is good for it.  And in an inversion 
of Stephen’s claims about the common interests of the “the two great 
divisions of mankind”14 it is striking that evolutionary theory—now far 
advanced, of course, since Stephen’s time—not only regards the sexes as 
competitors with very different genetic and psychological interests, but 
even views different parts of single organisms as in competition with 
each other. 
This radical difference in their understandings of nature is not explicit 
in the debate between Mill and his opponents, even though it was 
recognized at the time that conservative and liberal politicians did have 
different ideas about how societies ought to develop.  Indeed, there are 
several indications in the text that Mill still had some elements of the 
natural law theory mixed in with his own approach.15  But the difference 
is there in the background, and accounts for the remarkable way in 
which Stephen’s arguments, specifically intended as a rebuttal of Mill’s, 
seem to pass Mill’s by.  Of course Stephen can recognize that there are 
 13. Id. at 197. 
 14. Id. at 198. 
 15. Mill’s arguments are developed in his essay Nature, in THREE ESSAYS ON 
RELIGION 4–65 (Prometheus Books 1998) (1874) (published posthumously). 
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women who are not satisfied with their position; but they are the ones 
who should be regarded as aberrant—in need of correction by surgery 
and leg irons.  To use them as a justification for sending other women 
into men’s sphere would be like distorting feet with ill-fitting shoes.  Of 
course Stephen recognizes that men and women have been subjected to 
systematically different educations, since that is what he recommends; 
but the nature of people is not discovered by controlled scientific 
experiment.  It is given in the nature of things.  As a result, Mill and Stephen 
have radically different approaches to problems about the organization 
of society in general, and marriage in particular.  Stephen is working in 
the natural law tradition, whereas Mill sees law as the means by which to 
improve a universe which has no natural moral order.  Mill’s use of the 
term “natural” is (most of the time) simply descriptive, while Stephen’s 
is prescriptive.  With such a fundamental, unarticulated difference between 
them, it is not surprising that the details of their arguments engage 
hardly at all. 
In practice, most views turn out to be an uneasy compromise between 
these two approaches.  But there is no reconciling them, which suggests 
that the most fundamental question for any individual or society 
engaging in any discussion of social and political organization is which 
kind of starting point to accept.  Obviously there will be no agreement 
about this.  But although there is no space to argue the matter here, I 
think it can be shown that natural law approaches to ethics are 
essentially connected with views that are more or less religious.  The 
prevailing democratic view about political institutions is that they should 
be founded on secular principles, while leaving people free to follow 
religious principles in their own lives. 
For anyone who starts on the basis of that assumption, questions about 
the justifiability of different arrangements for marriage must be 
approached without reference to ideas of natural law.  In other words, we 
need to take a consequentialist approach to fundamental questions of 
social organization.  We must try to understand the morally neutral 
workings of the world as well as we can, and try to devise social 
arrangements to make the best of it. 
The question now is how, in these terms, we should set about thinking 
about whether marriage should exist at all, and, if so, what form it 
should take. 




III.  THE ESSENCE OF TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE 
As already suggested, the essence of marriage lies in the institutions 
that define it, not in any set of phenomena.  It was a consideration of the 
institution, rather than of actual marriages, that led Mill to say that 
marriage was the only remaining form of slavery. 
However, although marriage in Mill’s time did indeed amount to a 
form of slavery, and although women had few options but to enter into 
it, to characterize the institution simply as slavery would be to give far 
too impressionistic an account of things. Marriage is essentially a 
contract between the sexes.  The laws and conventions that defined the 
nature of marriage are traditionally concerned primarily with sex, and, in 
particular with the regulation of female sexual behavior.  Roughly 
speaking, women in nineteenth-century England were required to abstain 
from sexual relations, and to avoid any suspicion of them, outside 
marriage, on pain of fierce social penalties for them and any resulting 
children. 
So this, even more fundamentally than the elements Mill described, 
was the essence of the institution of marriage at the time.  It offered 
women support, which most of them otherwise found it difficult to get, 
in return for their chastity, as well as for more general servitude, and 
handing ownership of their possessions and children to men.  If the 
institution of marriage was to be justified in its traditional form, these 
were among the elements that had to be taken into account. 
This aspect of matters did not arise in the nineteenth-century debate, 
probably because most of it was taken completely for granted by most 
people.  But when it is considered, it becomes obvious that the usual 
contemporary justifications of the arrangements for marriage, in terms of 
claims about the sexes’ natural suitability for different kinds of work, 
were entirely irrelevant.  What is needed is something much more on the 
lines of Hume’s justification of “the modesty and chastity which belong 
to the fair sex,”16 when he claimed that men should not have to support 
children that were not known to be theirs.  The asymmetry defended by 
Hume was based on a genuine, systematic difference between the sexes. 
Women, in the nature of things, know who their children are; men do 
not, as long as women are on the loose. 
If, then, Hume’s premise about the injustice of having to support 
children that are not one’s own is accepted as a starting point, to what 
extent would this justify the traditional institution of marriage?  
Presumably it would justify devices for watching the activities of 
 16. DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 570 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 
Oxford Univ. Press 1888) (1739). 
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married women, to make sure they did not risk landing their husbands 
with spurious children, and social acceptance of men’s not being 
expected to support the children of women who could not demonstrate 
their fidelity. 
However, that does not come anywhere near justifying the traditional 
arrangements as a whole.  Once again, there is no point in having rules 
to bring about what would happen anyway.  Thinking along Humean 
lines would explain a natural female caution: Ordinary prudence might 
make women not want to risk pregnancy before they had a man 
committed to their support, or rejection if they gave any grounds doubt 
of paternity within marriage.  But it could not justify, for instance, the 
severe social punishment (as opposed to natural disadvantage) of erring 
unmarried women who found themselves pregnant, or the stigmatizing 
of their children as illegitimate.  Nor would it justify such things as the 
extent of a husband’s power over a wife, let alone the ownership of her 
property and legitimate children, and the difficulties placed in the way of 
women who wanted any function in life other than that of bearers of 
legitimate children for men.  Arrangements such as these were not 
needed as guarantors of paternity; what they did was much stronger than 
that.  They amounted to devices for making it positively difficult—more 
difficult than it is by nature—for women to have children on their own.  
Whatever anyone’s intentions, or whatever the historical explanation of 
marriage at the time, its objective function was to put women, and their 
capacity to bear children, into the control of men.17 
So Hume’s account, although going in the right direction for dealing 
with some parts of the question, leaves too much of the institution 
without justification.  It cannot justify even the extent of the purely 
sexual controls on women, let alone the all-purpose inequality of the 
sexes both within and before marriage. 
There is also another problem of Hume’s line of argument.  Although 
the principle that men should not be saddled with the support of children 
not their own may be plausible in itself, there is no mention of what 
might reasonably be regarded as the reciprocal principle required by 
justice: that anyone who does engender a child should be required to 
support it. 
 17. This is presented as an analysis of the objective function of the institution, not 
as an explanation of how it came about.  Nevertheless, it provides a highly plausible 
explanatory hypothesis. 
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What would be required by such a principle?  It would, of course, give 
the kind of support actually guaranteed by marriage to properly-behaved 
women and their children.  But it would require far more than that.  In 
particular, it would require restraints on men to prevent their impregnating 
women to whose support they were not committed—perhaps chaperoning 
of men when they were in the company of women, and strong requirements 
of support for any women with whom they did father children, and 
punishing them with social ostracism if they were found to have eluded 
this vigilance and fallen.  It would also involve making sure that if they 
tried to abandon impregnated or otherwise damaged women, they were 
forced to remain responsible for their support.  In other words, it would 
suggest imposing on men something remarkably like the traditional 
constraints on women. 
It is striking, therefore, that if you add the reciprocal woman-protecting 
principle to Hume’s man-protecting principle you get something very like 
the situation of equality that Mill was recommending.  If he had been 
trying to justify marriage arrangements as a whole, including making 
marriage quite distinct from non-marriage, he could have done it on the 
basis of those two principles.  Hume’s principle—that anyone expected 
to support a child should be able to recognize it as their own—would 
justify a demand for chastity in married women.  And if you added to 
that the reciprocal principle that all people should support any children 
they did produce, this would call for putting men under pressure not to 
risk having children with women other than their wives.  (Note that this 
is not the same as a demand for chastity in unmarried women.)  This 
two-way principle of responsibility for children would justify limiting 
sex to married partners, and provide a plausible justification for an equal 
version of traditional marriage. 
IV.  THE CURRENT DEBATE 
We have now gone quite a long way towards removing the elements 
not justified by a combination of these two principles.  We have effectively 
removed the stigma of illegitimacy and single parenthood, and the 
positive obstacles to women’s trying to support themselves on their own.  
Indeed, we have even, to some extent, started to counteract the elements 
of natural disadvantage, by giving state support for single parents and 
their children.  We have also come much closer to achieving equality 
within marriage. 
But the problem is that although the legal and institutional inequalities 
of marriage have now gone, what remains unclear is whether that leaves 
any justification at all for marriage in a society that does not make 
natural law assumptions.  Since Mill’s time, science has brought about 
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radical changes which, in principle, could remove the whole of the 
secular justification for traditional marriage.  We can now separate sex 
and childbearing.  More recently, we can reliably identify paternity.  We 
can, if we want to, make sure that women cannot pass off other men’s 
children as their partner’s, and we can make sure that men are forced to 
support any children that are theirs.  Technology can now, in principle, 
do all the paternity checking that marriage of this traditional form is 
supposed to do. 
Perhaps this is part of the reason why in the West, at least, the 
significance of marriage has enormously declined.  The legal and social 
differentiation of treatment between the married and unmarried has 
changed beyond the recognition of a couple of generations ago.  Sex 
before marriage is normal, childbearing by single women and unmarried 
couples is no longer much condemned, men can be held responsible for 
the support of their children irrespective of whether they are married, 
and married couples can deal with their tax and incomes separately.  At 
the same time, expectations of behavior within marriage have lessened 
too.  Divorce is easy, desertion of wives and children by men is 
subjected to little social penalty (abandoned wives find that their 
husbands and their new partners are more socially acceptable than single 
older women), and adultery is a subject for newspaper titillation but no 
longer an outright scandal.  People do still choose to get married, but the 
social pressures to get them married, keep them married, or demand 
particular kinds of behavior within marriage, are negligible. 
And increasingly, presumably as another aspect of this decline, rules 
are having to be made for the organization of de facto relationships—for 
the organization of possessions and children.  Some of this has taken the 
form of imposing on informal relationships rules very much like those of 
marriage.  But whichever way it goes —whether marriage is made more 
like informal relationships, or the other way round, or both—the result is 
the lessening of marriage as an institution.  There are far fewer 
incentives for people to enter into an arrangement where there are more 
commitments than there otherwise would be. 
The question now is whether this is the right direction for society to 
take.  Should we regard marriage as an institution that has been superseded 
by technology and social change?  Or can we justify a special kind of 
contract that binds people more closely together than they are naturally 
inclined to be bound, and putting pressure on them to enter into it?  
Against the background of a liberal society, which places a high value on 
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individual freedom, such an institution would need positive justification.  
But if the kind of justification so far considered is no longer available—the 
kind Mill might have given if he had started with Hume’s arguments—what 
kind of justification might there be? 
The most plausible kind would probably be about the desirability of 
maintaining stability of various sorts—of the social value of maintaining 
families and fixed social networks, and in particular of providing 
stability for children.  It is at least not absurd to suggest that we might 
put people under considerable pressure to avoid having children without 
entering into a strong commitment to stay together until the children had 
grown up. 
However, although it might be possible to make out a plausible case 
for marriage by arguments along these lines, it is striking that such a 
justification would have no necessary connection with sex.  Originally, 
sex was the essence of marriage, and in the natural law view of things it 
is clear why it still should be.  But if it is accepted that a justification of 
marriage must be given in purely functional terms, and if the original 
purpose of identifying paternity is gradually becoming irrelevant, why 
should sex come into the matter at all? 
This is where the gay marriage issue arises.  If marriage can be 
justified at all, there seems no reason to exclude gay marriage, or, for 
that matter, marriage-like structures that go beyond couples.  Once ideas 
of natural law are abandoned, the question is wide open.  We just do not 
know, in advance of experiments, what will produce whatever kind of 
outcome we decide want. 
But before sex is dismissed altogether there is another matter to 
consider, also to do with the advance of science.  While science has been 
busy undermining all the traditional justifications for marriage, it has 
also been making great strides in the understanding of human nature—and, 
in particular, of the old question of how different the sexes are by nature.  
Perhaps sex might be brought back into marriage by this route. 
V.  THE NATURE OF THE SEXES 
It is significant that Mill’s arguments for equality in marriage in no 
way depended on claims that the sexes were alike, or that legal equality 
of the kind he wanted would lead to an equality of outcome between the 
sexes.  He took it for granted that the sexes’ functions would be different 
in marriage, because of women’s necessary involvement with children, 
and, like Stephen, he took it for granted that in choosing marriage and 
children, a women in effect “renounced all careers but one.”  But he left 
completely open the question of how different the sexes were by nature 
in less tangible ways, such as emotions and abilities, because this was a 
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matter impossible to judge in the present state of society, where the 
sexes had always been in systematically different environments.  But 
this was irrelevant to his case for legal equality.  The laws should treat 
everyone equally, and against the background of those laws individuals 
would find their own level. 
In our own times, however, Mill’s agnosticism has been replaced by 
the growing insistence of social scientists and feminists, and the Left in 
general, that observed differences between the sexes are cultural constructs.  
The meaning of “gender” was commandeered to refer to such supposedly 
nonbiological differences, and it is a sign of how taken for granted the 
social construction view has become to feminism that the substitution of 
“gender” for “sex” seems to have become compulsory among the 
politically enlightened. 
Still, the cultural construction view of psychological difference has 
always been implausible.  If human beings are regarded as belonging 
entirely to the natural world, as most social construction theorists 
believe, and their emotions and intelligence as (however mysteriously) 
functions of matter rather than properties of separately infused souls, 
differences in mind must ultimately be connected with differences of 
bodily construction and chemistry.  It would be astonishing if the main 
systematic division within the species managed to avoid any correlation 
with differences of mind and temperament.  And science, which has 
progressed a good deal since the time of Mill, is increasingly proving 
that it has not. We now have direct physiological evidence of strong 
tendencies to mental and emotional differences between the sexes, and 
even more is coming from the new direction of evolutionary studies. 
Darwin himself recognized that as soon as evolution produced 
creatures with emotions and intelligence, these qualities would be as 
relevant to the evolutionary fate of their possessors as would anything 
else about them.  Evolutionary theorists approach the problem identified 
by Mill—that of disentangling any natural differences between the sexes 
from the ones produced by different environments—by using our 
understanding of evolutionary processes to generate hypotheses.  This 
approach does not make the human sciences easy, but it does provide a 
direction of approach that makes them less absolutely intractable. 
And when the sexes are considered from that point of view, it 
becomes overwhelmingly likely that men and women must be 
psychologically different on average, just because of their reproductive 
differences.  A human female, reproducing flat out, can produce only 
RADCLIFFE-RICHARDS.DOC 10/5/2005  2:02 PM 
 
1138 
about one child a year.  A human male’s reproductive potential is limited 
only, though of course entirely, by his ability to impregnate females.  A 
female need make no effort at all to have children—males, unless 
actively kept at bay, will see to that—and no amount of sex can increase 
her reproductive potential.  She will do best, reproductively, if her 
emotions lead her to maximize the quality of her offspring, by selecting 
mates who are of high genetic quality, and who also (preferably) have 
important resources they can be relied on to give those offspring.  A 
male, on the other hand, is playing for higher stakes.  If he does well, he 
may have far more than his fair share of children; if he does badly, he 
may have none at all. If he is to succeed in the evolutionary competition, 
he will need quite different emotional characteristics from those of 
females. 
Reasoning along these lines has produced dozens of hypotheses about 
differences between men and women, and the problem for feminism is 
that many of these differing characteristics are instantly recognizable in 
women as they now are and traditionally have been.  Differences insistently 
attributed to culture are turning out to be ones that natural selection 
might be expected to have planted deep in the nature of the sexes.  There 
is nothing like a clean sweep: for instance, nothing in evolutionary 
psychology even begins to suggest that women are in any way less 
intelligent than men.  However, some things are disturbingly familiar.  
Women, by this reasoning, should be naturally attracted to impressive, 
high-status males from whom they seek undivided support and 
commitment, strongly devoted to the care of their children, and more 
concerned about emotional than sexual fidelity.  Men should be highly 
competitive towards other males, adventurous and anxious to outstrip 
other men in their access to women and control of their reproduction.  
While they should generally prefer youth and beauty, as indicators of 
fecundity, in the women whose offspring they intend to support, they 
should also be eager to grasp whatever sexual opportunities they can.  
For men, unlike women, each individual investment is small, and may 
have considerable reproductive payoff. 
Of course there will be, in this huge and developing area of inquiry, 
many detailed claims and research projects that are open to legitimate 
scientific criticism.  What is interesting, however, is that so many people 
on the political left use claims of bad science to dismiss not just 
particular parts of these enquiries, but the whole project of evolutionary 
psychology.  The whole idea that we can say anything about human 
nature in general, and about the sexes in particular, is regarded not only 
as scientifically bad, but also, more fundamentally, politically dangerous.  
This is explicit in many antisociobiology writings, and in the concerted 
opposition to this new area of enquiry. 
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It is the element of objection on principle that is relevant in this 
context, because here again appears the importance of clarifying the 
metaphysical underpinnings and showing the root of the difference 
between Mill and Stephen.  The principled opposition to evolutionary 
psychology shows a radical misunderstanding of what is going on.  The 
claims about the natures of the sexes may look rather like the traditional 
ones, but they are not.  Even to the extent that recent claims from 
evolutionary psychology about male and female nature sound like 
traditional ones, they are significantly different because there has been a 
change in what is meant by any claim about human nature. 
As already explained, to Stephen, like other natural law theorists, to 
understand the nature of something was to understand the essence of 
things of that kind, which involved understanding their proper function 
and recognizing aberrations.  But in the kind of world accepted by 
Mill—the kind developed in a radical Darwinian understanding of the 
world—to understand the nature of something implies nothing of the 
kind. 
In a Darwinian world, for instance, claims about the way evolution has 
shaped male and female emotions carry no implications whatever of 
homogeneity within the sexes, or of firm boundaries between them.  
There is no such thing as an essence of maleness and femaleness: no 
such thing as a true woman or a true man.  Since variation is the raw 
material of evolution by natural selection, you expect variation within 
the sexes, and, since they are both human, enormous overlap.  Ideas of 
fixed essences and clear distinctions between natural kinds belong only 
to the idea of an ordered universe where things are designed for 
particular places and functions. 
In a Darwinian world, similarly, to understand the nature of something 
is, among other things, to understand how its nature will and will not 
change in response to different environments.  The nature of something is 
not fixed.  How much change is possible is an open, empirical question, so 
claims about sex differences carry no implication of genetic determinism.  
It is only in a pre-Darwinian, ordered universe that the natures of things 
cannot be changed.  There is also not the slightest implication that 
characteristically male or female attributes will determine the actions of 
any man or woman, since how an individual acts will depend on 
innumerable other characteristics in combination with any sex-specific 
emotions.  Ideas of fixity, of boundaries, and of predetermination all 
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belong to the pre-Darwinian world, and so are irrelevant to the claims of 
evolutionary psychology. 
The mistake of confusing old and new understandings of nature 
shows, above all, in any idea that discoveries about the natures of the 
sexes have direct implications for how they should live and relate to 
each other.  There is no such implication.  What is alarming about the 
undesigned Darwinian world, within which evolutionary psychology 
makes its claims, is this lack of underlying moral order.  Evolution by 
natural selection produces harmony of any kind only to the extent that 
harmony promotes reproduction. Evolutionarily speaking, the sexes are 
rivals, and the result of that seems to be that there is a highly limited 
extent to which they can be expected to be psychologically well suited.  
Whatever may be achieved by well-matched or well-motivated 
individuals, there is no natural prescription for domestic harmony or 
social justice. 
Since conservatives always said that the sexes were different, and used 
it as their excuse for the traditional relegation of women to their 
subordinate sphere, it is not surprising that feminists reacted by denying 
it.  But it is only in the natural law tradition that the social prescription 
follows from claims about male and female nature.  The response 
appropriate to contemporary political, social and moral thinking is to 
reject not the detailed claims that are made, but all the presuppositions 
about what it is to understand the nature of things. 
If the world is understood in this way, it is potentially catastrophic to 
reject hypotheses about human nature just because they have a superficial 
resemblance to the bases on which traditionalists made their normative 
claims.  Whatever we hope to do, we cannot do it without understanding 
what we are up against.  If science is showing us that men and women 
are different, as it certainly seems to be, that is something we need to 
know.  The last thing we can afford is resistance that comes from 
encumbering Darwinian claims about human nature with incompatible 
residues of a pre-Darwinian world. 
VI.  SEX AND MARRIAGE, NEW VERSION 
There are many other ways in which natural law presuppositions 
appear, heavily disguised, in current liberal and radical political 
thinking.  The main argument here is that they need to be identified and 
recognized for what they are.  That is just a methodological point. 
Still, it may be asked: Even though it may be a mistake to resist 
recent ideas about sex differences as a result of confusing them with 
similar-sounding traditional ideas, are they of any relevance to the 
current debate about marriage?  If Mill thought that we could decide on 
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a just framework for marriage without knowing about the natures of 
the sexes, should we not just take the same approach now?  Perhaps we 
should think in perfectly general terms about the value of certain kinds 
of commitment, and then wait to see which people choose to enter it. 
But if we are thinking in a large way about social organization, it is 
not enough to think in abstract about what should be allowed or not 
allowed.  Social planning involves adjusting a complex set of incentives 
and disincentives, with a view to achieving better cumulative effects 
from individual choices.  To do this well we need to know about human 
nature in general and if, as we presume, sex is a large part of human 
nature, we may need to take that into account. 
It is politically difficult to raise issues like this, because in practice it 
tends to be presumed that even to raise a question is to argue for a 
political conclusion.  But it is perhaps worth throwing in a speculation or 
two about considerations that might, some day, lead people to think that 
there was something to be said for pressures to get men and women 
together in stable relationships, and to keep them there beyond what 
might be their natural inclinations. 
The first of these is obvious and familiar: the matter of stable 
backgrounds for children.  We cannot presume that what is best for 
children is all a matter of social construction, and that if we could drop 
our prejudices in favor of traditional families, no one would be left out 
and everyone could flourish.  Something like that might, possibly, be 
true; but it is reasonable to be suspicious of convenient claims that 
children do just as well without continuous attachment to their mother, 
or that biological parentage is irrelevant, or that children are perfectly all 
right without fathers, or that it does not matter at all whether children 
have parents of both sexes, or that it is better for children if parents 
separate rather than stay together and quarrel.  Even if our current liberal 
arrangements really do tend in themselves to be bad for children they 
might still be justified, but if we are to assess the cost we need to be 
careful about the evidence. 
A different consideration in the same area is another matter of sexual 
justice.  Bearing and rearing children has for so long been regarded as a 
burden for women that it is easy to overlook the fact that when the use of 
the female reproductive system becomes optional, the ability to bear 
children is a huge natural advantage.  That, after all, is why women were 
taken over by men in the first place.  Women have an ability that men 
have not, and men can have no reliable relationship with their own 




children except through their connection with women (as many men are 
now acutely aware).  Is it fair to men that they should contribute to 
social funds, to support children, if women will not let them identify 
them as their own? 
And finally, there are wider questions about demographics and social 
order.  For instance, there is some evidence that women’s desire for 
high-status, impressive men was not just, as feminists tended to 
presume, the result of their needing to be supported when uncontrolled 
childbearing and legal constraints prevented their supporting themselves.  
Now that women are increasingly independent, the result seems to be 
that they want men of higher caliber still, and there are—in the nature of 
things—nothing like enough of them to go round.  If this is true, as it 
seems to be, it may have at least two adverse effects. 
One, of which most academics and other professionals are already 
well aware, is that married women with high-grade husbands are unsafe.  
Other women will be after their men, and those men, if given their own 
way, may well prefer younger women.  Women may find their lives 
thrown into chaos late in life, when they are (as Stephen said, I think 
rightly)18 doubly disadvantaged by their having invested in children at 
the expense of other possibilities, and men’s preference for younger 
women. 
Another, of which there is also some evidence, is that if women do not 
have to settle for unimpressive men just for the sake of support, or if 
men see that their support is unnecessary because women have other 
kinds available to them, there will be lots of unattached men.  
Polygamy—which is effectively what we have with serial monogamy 
and mistresses on the side—leaves many men without sex and families 
at all; and unattached men are, in significant numbers, well-known 
sources of trouble. Marriage is still, statistically, the best preventer of 
crime by men—even better than employment. 
Even if any or all of these considerations are well founded, they have no 
direct implications for politics.  They would not in themselves imply that we 
should resume making outcasts of single parents or married people who risk 
rocking the boat with exciting sexual encounters before the children have 
grown up, let alone that women should be under the kind of pressure to get 
married that lets them see taking on low-grade men as the best option open 
to them.  But on the other hand, if it is true that the breakdown of traditional 
marriage has had unwelcome side effects of the kinds described—and there 
is a lot of evidence that it has—this is something that we need to know.  
Only when we face up to the moral mess that results from evolution can we 
set about using our ingenuity to make things better. 
 18. STEPHEN, supra note 4, at 195–96. 
